First, I was way off with my prediction.
Here are the real results and some general thoughts:
ANC- 66% (or something just a hair below 2/3rds) = about the 2000 level, which is way higher than I thought they'd win. It's not quite the resounding 70% win they had in 2004, but it's still very convincing that the ANC is the only ruling party in SA.
Democratic Alliance- 16% I don't remember where I read this, but I remember reading a quote by one ANC member saying that if Jesus was a white woman, then that'd be Helen Zille. Anyway, this is pretty impressive. The DA is still a regional party for the most part, getting most of the votes from the Western Cape. They won an outright majority (51%) in the Western Cape province, which means something (I'm not exactly sure what, but I hear it should give Zille a fair amount of free reign to legislate provincially. This should be a great opportunity.) Other thoughts: parties still seem divided along racial lines. DA seems to be the party for white and coloured liberals. This isn't a terrible thing, just kinda shows that racial differences persist. Also, I was way off in my prediction. they emerged stronger than in 2004--my prediction that they'd wane from their spot as the main challenge party was off.
COPE- 7% I really had no clue when I predicted COPE would rake in nearly a fifth of the vote. I just figured enough people were disenchanted with the ANC, and would vote for a new party that was still made of enough veteran politicans that had fought against Apartheid. I was wrong. Guess COPE lacked substance. Being an alternative to the ANC is not enough. The challenging party needs a powerful and convincing message. I think that's a good thing.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
A wild guess
Just for fun, I wanted to guess the results of the SA 2009 elections. I don't have a strong basis for my guess--only articles from major periodicals, and my experience abroad from a year ago.
Here it goes:
ANC: 59%
COPE: 20%
DA: 10%
Other Parties: 11%
Here it goes:
ANC: 59%
COPE: 20%
DA: 10%
Other Parties: 11%
Monday, April 20, 2009
Zimbabwe turns 29: Mugabe Quotes!
Man is this going to sound pessimistic, but here it goes.
Mugable circa 2001:
The MDC will never form the government of this country, never ever, not in my lifetime or even after I dies. Ndinya kupikirei ndinomuka chidhoma—I swear my ghost will come after you. (Meredith: 177)
The MDC should never be judged or characterized by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density [urban] elements. It is much deeper, whiter, and wider than these human superficies; for it is immovable and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old as strong as the forces and interests that bore and nurtured it; that converge on and control it; that drive and direct it; indeed that support, sponsor and spur it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan Horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslave and oppressed our people yesterday. (Meredith: 192)
Mugabe 2009:
As Zimbabweans, we need to create an environment of tolerance, and treat one another with dignity and decency, irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, tribe, political or religious affiliation
...We are grateful that the formation of an inclusive government has allowed the spirit of oneness in which we celebrate our 29th year of independence. (al jazeera)
Needless to say, I seriously question the longevity of this coalition government. If I were Tsvangirai, I'd be very scared that Mugabe was going to do something crazy.
Mugable circa 2001:
The MDC will never form the government of this country, never ever, not in my lifetime or even after I dies. Ndinya kupikirei ndinomuka chidhoma—I swear my ghost will come after you. (Meredith: 177)
The MDC should never be judged or characterized by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density [urban] elements. It is much deeper, whiter, and wider than these human superficies; for it is immovable and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old as strong as the forces and interests that bore and nurtured it; that converge on and control it; that drive and direct it; indeed that support, sponsor and spur it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan Horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslave and oppressed our people yesterday. (Meredith: 192)
Mugabe 2009:
As Zimbabweans, we need to create an environment of tolerance, and treat one another with dignity and decency, irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, tribe, political or religious affiliation
...We are grateful that the formation of an inclusive government has allowed the spirit of oneness in which we celebrate our 29th year of independence. (al jazeera)
Needless to say, I seriously question the longevity of this coalition government. If I were Tsvangirai, I'd be very scared that Mugabe was going to do something crazy.
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Colonialism's Legacy
One of colonialism's worst legacies is the level of mistrust that it has left in nations that were once imperial outposts. Colonialism undoubtedly left many other terrible legacies--but, I think that, among these terrible legacies is the fact that some incredibly smart and capable leaders have allowed a well-founded mistrust of the West lead to some terrible decisions.
Maybe this sounds like a West-centric, pretentious comment to make, but in short, I believe this mistrust has led many smart, rational leaders to act irrationally.
I think of Thabo Mbeki and his lofty, inspiring vision of the African Renaissance and then I look at his AIDS policy. A deep mistrust of Western actions led an incredibly smart, highly rational man to illogically deny AIDS as a fictitious Western creation. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans died as a result of Mbeki's AIDS denialist policy (365,000 deaths by some counts). Against the overwhelming consensus of a scientific community, Mbeki tacitly endorsed the small minority of AIDS denialists. In 2001, he said the following in reference to AIDS:
Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust. (Wikipedia)
In short, mistrust of the West led Mbeki to view HIV as a product of Western racism--rather than the deadly, but treatable virus that it is.
Similarly, I think of Robert Mugabe as a brilliant man--a hero of African independence and African nationalism--whose mistrust of the West caused him to make some terrible, irrational decisions, and to ultimately go completely insane.
During the decade he spent as political prisoner and in the time before he became involved in the independence struggle, Mugabe earned six degrees. He was a teacher of teachers and he was driven; determined to push his knowledge and intellect as far as he could, and determined to fight for freedom and equality.
And his ideology and struggle were both courageous and savvy. While Joshua Nkomo (leader of ZAPU, a rival party in Zim's liberation struggle) was trying to negotiate for a peaceful transition to majority rule, Mugabe sought total concessions from the Rhodesian minority and an unrestricted transition to majority rule. At the Lancaster House agreements, Mugabe stood out for his uncompromising commitment to complete independence. Unlike other liberation fighters, he questioned the agreements because they still guaranteed whites a set number of seats in Parliament and protected their land rights for the next decade.
He advocated violence, but he also advocated a complete revolution whereby the racial hierarchies of Rhodesian rule would be torn down completely. Although I'm against violence and I think an extreme approach to change can be counter productive, I admire the revolutionary goals that Mugabe held and the unrelenting approach Mugabe took in seeking social change.
In short, Mugabe's deep mistrust of the West was an admirable and highly effective force in the liberation struggle. Perhaps without it, Rhodesian whites would've clung to power for as long as South African whites.
And what impresses me even more about Mugabe is that following independence, Mugabe was able to initially put this mistrust (and the atrocities of the past) behind him. He acted like a Mandela figure--transcending the unspeakable mistreatment of Africans--and forging an idealistic and pragmatic approach to the future. In speaking with Ken Flower, the head of the CIO (like the CIA) during Rhodesian rule, he said the following (He said this after Flower admitted to trying to assassinate Mugabe on several occasions):
As far as I have realised the position, we were trying to kill each other; that's what the war was about. What I'm concerned with now is that my public statements should be believed when I say I have drawn a line through the past. From now on we must trust each other if we are to work together for the benefit of the majority. I want people to believe in my policy of reconciliation and to respond accordingly (Meredith, 42-43).
There are a few things about this quote that stand out to me:
- Mugabe is unbelievably forgiving--he seems almost too forgiving (I couldn't have said that to Flowers).
- Mugabe is more concerned with the future than he is with the past. He wants to "draw a line through the past" and focus on future problems.
- Mugabe exhibits both pragmatism and optimism. While the past atrocities of the white minority should cause Mugabe to act with myopic mistrust, he realizes that this concern is subsidiary to the future. His immediate focus is on the future and on the welfare of the majority of Zimbabweans
This suspension of mistrust, however, was short-lived. Eventually Mugabe's focus on the future gave way to a desire for personal power and a drive to create a one-party state. Mugabe sought to punish political opponents and reward sycophantic allies. He turned the state into an engine for nepotistic greed rather than for social support and infrastructure building. He grabbed land and industry from whites. He blamed Zimbabwe's sufferings on the secret workings of Western spies working for Rhodesian interests. And he called opponents, like the MDC, puppets of the West and "manifestation[s] of 'the resurgence of white power'" (Meredith, 192). His mistrust of the West began to subsume every issue.
Maybe Mugabe believed that the only way to give Zimbabweans real power was to punish the white minority and seize all their resources--maybe he believed, as he did pre-independence, that the only way for real change was through complete revolution. Or alternatively, maybe Mugabe used race as a justification for his own desire for power--maybe racial mistrust was a convenient justification for a power hungry tryrant. I don't know.
But what strikes me is that Mugabe's initial desire to put mistrust aside, and begin on a clean slate, was short lived. His desire to focus on the future, soon gave way to a believe that the past was more important. Defeating past ghosts and correcting past errors created a state built on personal greed--a state where the majority of Zimbabweans suffered. The economy, rival political parties, deteriorating health care and education were all blamed on the West and the minority of Rhodesian whites. Mistrust of the West caused illogical, paranoid policies that exacerbated existing problems.
I believe this is one of colonialism's worst legacies. A legacy whereby many of the brightest, most driven leaders of the future are weighed down by historical injustices of the past. Legacies of the past force leaders to put on historical lenses that are detrimental to the future welfare of the majority. They cause irrationality and distortion. While the basis for this mistrust is legitimate, the actions that this mistrust often justifies are not.
Sources cited:
I just finished reading Martin Meredith's Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe
Good, not great, book. It did a good job introducing me to Zimbabwe's history under Mugabe, but still left me wanting to better understand Mugabe. Seemed more focused on a narrow "Great Man" theory rather than the political and social forces that shaped and surrounded Mugabe (and Zimbabwe as a whole).
Maybe this sounds like a West-centric, pretentious comment to make, but in short, I believe this mistrust has led many smart, rational leaders to act irrationally.
I think of Thabo Mbeki and his lofty, inspiring vision of the African Renaissance and then I look at his AIDS policy. A deep mistrust of Western actions led an incredibly smart, highly rational man to illogically deny AIDS as a fictitious Western creation. Hundreds of thousands of South Africans died as a result of Mbeki's AIDS denialist policy (365,000 deaths by some counts). Against the overwhelming consensus of a scientific community, Mbeki tacitly endorsed the small minority of AIDS denialists. In 2001, he said the following in reference to AIDS:
Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust. (Wikipedia)
In short, mistrust of the West led Mbeki to view HIV as a product of Western racism--rather than the deadly, but treatable virus that it is.
Similarly, I think of Robert Mugabe as a brilliant man--a hero of African independence and African nationalism--whose mistrust of the West caused him to make some terrible, irrational decisions, and to ultimately go completely insane.
During the decade he spent as political prisoner and in the time before he became involved in the independence struggle, Mugabe earned six degrees. He was a teacher of teachers and he was driven; determined to push his knowledge and intellect as far as he could, and determined to fight for freedom and equality.
And his ideology and struggle were both courageous and savvy. While Joshua Nkomo (leader of ZAPU, a rival party in Zim's liberation struggle) was trying to negotiate for a peaceful transition to majority rule, Mugabe sought total concessions from the Rhodesian minority and an unrestricted transition to majority rule. At the Lancaster House agreements, Mugabe stood out for his uncompromising commitment to complete independence. Unlike other liberation fighters, he questioned the agreements because they still guaranteed whites a set number of seats in Parliament and protected their land rights for the next decade.
He advocated violence, but he also advocated a complete revolution whereby the racial hierarchies of Rhodesian rule would be torn down completely. Although I'm against violence and I think an extreme approach to change can be counter productive, I admire the revolutionary goals that Mugabe held and the unrelenting approach Mugabe took in seeking social change.
In short, Mugabe's deep mistrust of the West was an admirable and highly effective force in the liberation struggle. Perhaps without it, Rhodesian whites would've clung to power for as long as South African whites.
And what impresses me even more about Mugabe is that following independence, Mugabe was able to initially put this mistrust (and the atrocities of the past) behind him. He acted like a Mandela figure--transcending the unspeakable mistreatment of Africans--and forging an idealistic and pragmatic approach to the future. In speaking with Ken Flower, the head of the CIO (like the CIA) during Rhodesian rule, he said the following (He said this after Flower admitted to trying to assassinate Mugabe on several occasions):
As far as I have realised the position, we were trying to kill each other; that's what the war was about. What I'm concerned with now is that my public statements should be believed when I say I have drawn a line through the past. From now on we must trust each other if we are to work together for the benefit of the majority. I want people to believe in my policy of reconciliation and to respond accordingly (Meredith, 42-43).
There are a few things about this quote that stand out to me:
- Mugabe is unbelievably forgiving--he seems almost too forgiving (I couldn't have said that to Flowers).
- Mugabe is more concerned with the future than he is with the past. He wants to "draw a line through the past" and focus on future problems.
- Mugabe exhibits both pragmatism and optimism. While the past atrocities of the white minority should cause Mugabe to act with myopic mistrust, he realizes that this concern is subsidiary to the future. His immediate focus is on the future and on the welfare of the majority of Zimbabweans
This suspension of mistrust, however, was short-lived. Eventually Mugabe's focus on the future gave way to a desire for personal power and a drive to create a one-party state. Mugabe sought to punish political opponents and reward sycophantic allies. He turned the state into an engine for nepotistic greed rather than for social support and infrastructure building. He grabbed land and industry from whites. He blamed Zimbabwe's sufferings on the secret workings of Western spies working for Rhodesian interests. And he called opponents, like the MDC, puppets of the West and "manifestation[s] of 'the resurgence of white power'" (Meredith, 192). His mistrust of the West began to subsume every issue.
Maybe Mugabe believed that the only way to give Zimbabweans real power was to punish the white minority and seize all their resources--maybe he believed, as he did pre-independence, that the only way for real change was through complete revolution. Or alternatively, maybe Mugabe used race as a justification for his own desire for power--maybe racial mistrust was a convenient justification for a power hungry tryrant. I don't know.
But what strikes me is that Mugabe's initial desire to put mistrust aside, and begin on a clean slate, was short lived. His desire to focus on the future, soon gave way to a believe that the past was more important. Defeating past ghosts and correcting past errors created a state built on personal greed--a state where the majority of Zimbabweans suffered. The economy, rival political parties, deteriorating health care and education were all blamed on the West and the minority of Rhodesian whites. Mistrust of the West caused illogical, paranoid policies that exacerbated existing problems.
I believe this is one of colonialism's worst legacies. A legacy whereby many of the brightest, most driven leaders of the future are weighed down by historical injustices of the past. Legacies of the past force leaders to put on historical lenses that are detrimental to the future welfare of the majority. They cause irrationality and distortion. While the basis for this mistrust is legitimate, the actions that this mistrust often justifies are not.
Sources cited:
I just finished reading Martin Meredith's Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe
Good, not great, book. It did a good job introducing me to Zimbabwe's history under Mugabe, but still left me wanting to better understand Mugabe. Seemed more focused on a narrow "Great Man" theory rather than the political and social forces that shaped and surrounded Mugabe (and Zimbabwe as a whole).
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Monday, April 6, 2009
South Africa 2009
2009 is a year of big elections. In the coming months, there will be presidential elections in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and India.
On April 22nd, South Africans will vote for their next president. What makes this election particularly interesting is that it will be the most competitive election in post-Apartheid South African history. Although the ANC will past the torch to its new leader (from Kgalema Motlanthe to Jacob Zuma), this election reflects the first big schism in the ANC party.
A long time coming
Jacob Zuma will be elected South Africa's fourth president. In many ways, this is a long time coming. In December 2007, at Polokwane (the ANC national convention), Zuma was elected as the leader of the ANC, despite the fact that his ANC peer and political rival, Thabo Mbeki, was still serving as president. This effectively made Zuma the President-elect, and left Mbeki a lame duck. Further signaling Zuma's rise was the ANC national executive committee's decision in September 2008 to no longer support Mbeki. Without the full support of his own party, Mbeki resigned days later.
Throughout the past year, the schism in the ANC has grown wider. Following Mbeki's resignation, Mbeki-loyalists within the ANC formed the Congress of the People Party (COPE).
And in recent weeks the ill will between these two parties has only grown. Along the campagin trail, there has been an intensifying tit-for-tat between COPE and ANC. COPE-leaning media outlets have accused ANC leaders of attempting to bribe COPE members to return to the ANC, and in response the ANC has accused these media outlets of creating fake news stories to discredit the ANC. Additionally, Cosatu (the labor wing of the ANC), has begun distributing anti-COPE pamphlets that portray COPE members as corrupt, ultra-capitalist, fat cats and accuses them of passing self-serving anti-labor, neoliberal reforms during their time as ANC members. (which makes you wonder, why the ANC didn't do anything at the time, if they really believe these MPs to be so awful and corrupt)
Even Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been thrown into the political tussle. Last week, he stirred ANC anger by saying that "In the year of [US President Barack] Obama, can you imagine what it is like when you are walking in New York and they ask you who will be the next president?...At the present time, I can't pretend to be looking forward to having [Zuma] as my president." The ANC Youth League flung more dirt by offering some immature "advice" to the Nobel laureate.
The big issue
Looming over all of this partisan bickering, is the National Prosectutions Authority's (NPA) decision on Monday to drop corruption charges against Zuma. Zuma faced charges that he had accepted bribes from his financial adviser, Schabir Shaik. Among the accusations, was a claim that Zuma had accepted bribes to help pave the way for a $4.8 billion national arms purchase.
So with a corruption controversy, the formation of a new party of ANC dissidents, and intense partisan fighting, South Africa will have its most competitive election ever. The ANC will almost certainly lose the two-thirds majority (needed to rubber stamp legislation) that it now enjoys, but the party will retain the presidency.
What does all this mean
It's hard to tell the difference between a "healthy" democracy and one that is dangerously fractured. Intense campaigning can be indicative of either. In the US intense campaigning is often lauded as reflective of our democratic culture; in other nations it is interpreted as indicating imminent collapse.
When I was in South Africa, I was surprised that the ANC enjoyed such wide and unquestioned support. Coming from the US, and its two-party system, I couldn't understand how any political party could be so intensely popular. A classmate at UCT explained to me that the ANC enjoyed such wide support because it was still greatly associated with the liberation movement. It was the party of Mandela and other freedom fighters, and most South Africans believed that political unity of the post-Apartheid nation was integral to success. My friend knew that the ANC would eventually split; a party composed of free-market capitalists and communist party members could only last for so long. But even so, my friend predicted that the ANC had another decade or two of unity ahead of it.
Now, the schism between two immense figures--Zuma and Mbeki--has caused this split.
I think that this election will reflect the first awkward, fledging attempts at competitive, multiparty elections. I think the ANC will still receive resounding support and show its electoral power. And I think that COPE will need to regroup, talk with other minority parties, and provide a platform that is wider than its disgruntlement with the ANC if it wants to eventually challenge ANC dominance.
I am, however, concerned that the Zuma investigation will loom over South African politics. The NPA's choice to not investigate Zuma leaves the charges against him still unresolved. If Zuma is guilty, he will remain unpunished for corruption, and if he is innocent, Zuma will not be absolved of the charges against him. What's more Mbeki is implicated as tainting the investigation, so he too remains unpunished or unabsolved. It's a less-than-ideal situation to move forward from.
It's a political decision, not a judicial decision. And it's realism, not idealism. But maybe idealism is for one-party unity governments of the past, and realism is for competitive, healthy elections of the future.
On April 22nd, South Africans will vote for their next president. What makes this election particularly interesting is that it will be the most competitive election in post-Apartheid South African history. Although the ANC will past the torch to its new leader (from Kgalema Motlanthe to Jacob Zuma), this election reflects the first big schism in the ANC party.
A long time coming
Jacob Zuma will be elected South Africa's fourth president. In many ways, this is a long time coming. In December 2007, at Polokwane (the ANC national convention), Zuma was elected as the leader of the ANC, despite the fact that his ANC peer and political rival, Thabo Mbeki, was still serving as president. This effectively made Zuma the President-elect, and left Mbeki a lame duck. Further signaling Zuma's rise was the ANC national executive committee's decision in September 2008 to no longer support Mbeki. Without the full support of his own party, Mbeki resigned days later.
Throughout the past year, the schism in the ANC has grown wider. Following Mbeki's resignation, Mbeki-loyalists within the ANC formed the Congress of the People Party (COPE).
And in recent weeks the ill will between these two parties has only grown. Along the campagin trail, there has been an intensifying tit-for-tat between COPE and ANC. COPE-leaning media outlets have accused ANC leaders of attempting to bribe COPE members to return to the ANC, and in response the ANC has accused these media outlets of creating fake news stories to discredit the ANC. Additionally, Cosatu (the labor wing of the ANC), has begun distributing anti-COPE pamphlets that portray COPE members as corrupt, ultra-capitalist, fat cats and accuses them of passing self-serving anti-labor, neoliberal reforms during their time as ANC members. (which makes you wonder, why the ANC didn't do anything at the time, if they really believe these MPs to be so awful and corrupt)
Even Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been thrown into the political tussle. Last week, he stirred ANC anger by saying that "In the year of [US President Barack] Obama, can you imagine what it is like when you are walking in New York and they ask you who will be the next president?...At the present time, I can't pretend to be looking forward to having [Zuma] as my president." The ANC Youth League flung more dirt by offering some immature "advice" to the Nobel laureate.
The big issue
Looming over all of this partisan bickering, is the National Prosectutions Authority's (NPA) decision on Monday to drop corruption charges against Zuma. Zuma faced charges that he had accepted bribes from his financial adviser, Schabir Shaik. Among the accusations, was a claim that Zuma had accepted bribes to help pave the way for a $4.8 billion national arms purchase.
So with a corruption controversy, the formation of a new party of ANC dissidents, and intense partisan fighting, South Africa will have its most competitive election ever. The ANC will almost certainly lose the two-thirds majority (needed to rubber stamp legislation) that it now enjoys, but the party will retain the presidency.
What does all this mean
It's hard to tell the difference between a "healthy" democracy and one that is dangerously fractured. Intense campaigning can be indicative of either. In the US intense campaigning is often lauded as reflective of our democratic culture; in other nations it is interpreted as indicating imminent collapse.
When I was in South Africa, I was surprised that the ANC enjoyed such wide and unquestioned support. Coming from the US, and its two-party system, I couldn't understand how any political party could be so intensely popular. A classmate at UCT explained to me that the ANC enjoyed such wide support because it was still greatly associated with the liberation movement. It was the party of Mandela and other freedom fighters, and most South Africans believed that political unity of the post-Apartheid nation was integral to success. My friend knew that the ANC would eventually split; a party composed of free-market capitalists and communist party members could only last for so long. But even so, my friend predicted that the ANC had another decade or two of unity ahead of it.
Now, the schism between two immense figures--Zuma and Mbeki--has caused this split.
I think that this election will reflect the first awkward, fledging attempts at competitive, multiparty elections. I think the ANC will still receive resounding support and show its electoral power. And I think that COPE will need to regroup, talk with other minority parties, and provide a platform that is wider than its disgruntlement with the ANC if it wants to eventually challenge ANC dominance.
I am, however, concerned that the Zuma investigation will loom over South African politics. The NPA's choice to not investigate Zuma leaves the charges against him still unresolved. If Zuma is guilty, he will remain unpunished for corruption, and if he is innocent, Zuma will not be absolved of the charges against him. What's more Mbeki is implicated as tainting the investigation, so he too remains unpunished or unabsolved. It's a less-than-ideal situation to move forward from.
It's a political decision, not a judicial decision. And it's realism, not idealism. But maybe idealism is for one-party unity governments of the past, and realism is for competitive, healthy elections of the future.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Between a rock and a hard place
The subject of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its unending spree of violence in Central Africa is a disturbing topic that deserves greater international attention and action.
That said, there are incredible obstacles that the international community faces in trying to stop the LRA:
When the ICC or an international body is asked to intervene, there are a couple of obstacles that this support brings with it. When the ICC intervenes, some form of criminal prosecution must take place. Either the ICC must investigate and prosecute the accused, or the nation that asked for support must create a national judiciary to investigate and prosecute the accused. Either way, when the ICC is asked to become involved, some action must take place against the accused.
This can hurt peacekeeping efforts. If two groups want to reconcile and negotiate peace, then having an international body investigating and pushing punitive action against one of the actors impedes mediation.
For instance, in Sudan, when prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir many believed this would stifle the peace process and exacerbate the conflict. It was fantastic that an arrest warrant was issued for Bashir for the atrocities he committed (or at the very least, the atrocities he endorsed); however, this type of international action and pressure can have a destabilizing effect.
Similarly, in Uganda the government asked the ICC to investigate and prosecute Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC had not gotten far in investigating these charges, when the Ugandan government decided to begin a series of peace talks with the LRA. The government had come to believe that the best way to end the nearly two-decade long terror that the LRA had wreaked on civilians was by engaging them in peace talks. Despite having reached out to the ICC, many in the he Ugandan government thought that the best way to avoid further civilian deaths was to forgive and forget.
As hard a pill as it is to swallow—to give amnesty to a man like Jospeh Kony makes me question the notion of justice—some Ugandans believed this was the surest path to peace. A military campaign led by a regional army had tried to eliminate the LRA, but with futile and often back-firing results. With each campaign against the LRA, the LRA reemerges in an even fiercer and more gruesome manner.
But with the simultaneous ICC investigation that was underway, peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA were seriously compromised. How could a peace agreement between the two be reached if the LRA knew that giving up violence might mean international prosecution?
So this is the spot where I see the ICC and international groups: they’re often stuck between a rock and a hard place.
Letting men like Bashir and Kony run free is inexcusable. Their atrocities are startling. And when a national government asks the ICC for support, the burden to prosecute these men becomes even greater.
But how can the ICC act if it knows that its actions will further destabilize a country? How can the ICC act if it knows that doing the right thing may lead to more civilian deaths?
What should the ICC priority be: peace or justice? And should the ICC have to choose between the two? Is there a way that both can be achieved?
Now that peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government have broken down, I believe the international community should become much more involved in ending the conflict. Nonetheless, I believe that it’s necessary to recognize the difficult position that international organizations are often stuck in. Conflicts are messy, and their resolutions are often long, and difficult tasks. Understanding the balance and obstacles to this process, and asking these questions, is essential.
That said, there are incredible obstacles that the international community faces in trying to stop the LRA:
When the ICC or an international body is asked to intervene, there are a couple of obstacles that this support brings with it. When the ICC intervenes, some form of criminal prosecution must take place. Either the ICC must investigate and prosecute the accused, or the nation that asked for support must create a national judiciary to investigate and prosecute the accused. Either way, when the ICC is asked to become involved, some action must take place against the accused.
This can hurt peacekeeping efforts. If two groups want to reconcile and negotiate peace, then having an international body investigating and pushing punitive action against one of the actors impedes mediation.
For instance, in Sudan, when prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir many believed this would stifle the peace process and exacerbate the conflict. It was fantastic that an arrest warrant was issued for Bashir for the atrocities he committed (or at the very least, the atrocities he endorsed); however, this type of international action and pressure can have a destabilizing effect.
Similarly, in Uganda the government asked the ICC to investigate and prosecute Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC had not gotten far in investigating these charges, when the Ugandan government decided to begin a series of peace talks with the LRA. The government had come to believe that the best way to end the nearly two-decade long terror that the LRA had wreaked on civilians was by engaging them in peace talks. Despite having reached out to the ICC, many in the he Ugandan government thought that the best way to avoid further civilian deaths was to forgive and forget.
As hard a pill as it is to swallow—to give amnesty to a man like Jospeh Kony makes me question the notion of justice—some Ugandans believed this was the surest path to peace. A military campaign led by a regional army had tried to eliminate the LRA, but with futile and often back-firing results. With each campaign against the LRA, the LRA reemerges in an even fiercer and more gruesome manner.
But with the simultaneous ICC investigation that was underway, peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA were seriously compromised. How could a peace agreement between the two be reached if the LRA knew that giving up violence might mean international prosecution?
So this is the spot where I see the ICC and international groups: they’re often stuck between a rock and a hard place.
Letting men like Bashir and Kony run free is inexcusable. Their atrocities are startling. And when a national government asks the ICC for support, the burden to prosecute these men becomes even greater.
But how can the ICC act if it knows that its actions will further destabilize a country? How can the ICC act if it knows that doing the right thing may lead to more civilian deaths?
What should the ICC priority be: peace or justice? And should the ICC have to choose between the two? Is there a way that both can be achieved?
Now that peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government have broken down, I believe the international community should become much more involved in ending the conflict. Nonetheless, I believe that it’s necessary to recognize the difficult position that international organizations are often stuck in. Conflicts are messy, and their resolutions are often long, and difficult tasks. Understanding the balance and obstacles to this process, and asking these questions, is essential.
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