Between a rock and a hard place

The subject of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its unending spree of violence in Central Africa is a disturbing topic that deserves greater international attention and action.

That said, there are incredible obstacles that the international community faces in trying to stop the LRA:

When the ICC or an international body is asked to intervene, there are a couple of obstacles that this support brings with it. When the ICC intervenes, some form of criminal prosecution must take place. Either the ICC must investigate and prosecute the accused, or the nation that asked for support must create a national judiciary to investigate and prosecute the accused. Either way, when the ICC is asked to become involved, some action must take place against the accused.

This can hurt peacekeeping efforts. If two groups want to reconcile and negotiate peace, then having an international body investigating and pushing punitive action against one of the actors impedes mediation.

For instance, in Sudan, when prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir many believed this would stifle the peace process and exacerbate the conflict. It was fantastic that an arrest warrant was issued for Bashir for the atrocities he committed (or at the very least, the atrocities he endorsed); however, this type of international action and pressure can have a destabilizing effect.

Similarly, in Uganda the government asked the ICC to investigate and prosecute Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC had not gotten far in investigating these charges, when the Ugandan government decided to begin a series of peace talks with the LRA. The government had come to believe that the best way to end the nearly two-decade long terror that the LRA had wreaked on civilians was by engaging them in peace talks. Despite having reached out to the ICC, many in the he Ugandan government thought that the best way to avoid further civilian deaths was to forgive and forget.

As hard a pill as it is to swallow—to give amnesty to a man like Jospeh Kony makes me question the notion of justice—some Ugandans believed this was the surest path to peace. A military campaign led by a regional army had tried to eliminate the LRA, but with futile and often back-firing results. With each campaign against the LRA, the LRA reemerges in an even fiercer and more gruesome manner.

But with the simultaneous ICC investigation that was underway, peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA were seriously compromised. How could a peace agreement between the two be reached if the LRA knew that giving up violence might mean international prosecution?

So this is the spot where I see the ICC and international groups: they’re often stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Letting men like Bashir and Kony run free is inexcusable. Their atrocities are startling. And when a national government asks the ICC for support, the burden to prosecute these men becomes even greater.

But how can the ICC act if it knows that its actions will further destabilize a country? How can the ICC act if it knows that doing the right thing may lead to more civilian deaths?

What should the ICC priority be: peace or justice? And should the ICC have to choose between the two? Is there a way that both can be achieved?

Now that peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government have broken down, I believe the international community should become much more involved in ending the conflict. Nonetheless, I believe that it’s necessary to recognize the difficult position that international organizations are often stuck in. Conflicts are messy, and their resolutions are often long, and difficult tasks. Understanding the balance and obstacles to this process, and asking these questions, is essential.