This past wednesday I cut my hair. It'd been nearly eleventh months without a hair cut and my blond locks were falling well below my shoulders. My hair was becoming part of my identity. It was a conversation starter with friends and a point of friendly teasing with others. I'd genially joke about how I was a hippie.
Now it's gone and I miss it. I was reluctant to shear it all off. I'd just planned to clean it up and keep it long, but when I sat in the barber's swivel chair I decided I'd push my limit. Not only is it gone, but it's short. Change is good I figured; it's good to go beyond your comfort zone; it's good to experience something new.
But change is tough. I miss my hair. I miss how an against-the-grain hairstyle differentiated me from others. My hair was not my entire identity, but it made up at least a large part of my superficial identity. I think that people I saw on the street or at work would see my hair and register the thought, "long hair," and immediately frame their interactions and their reading of me on this superficial appearance.
If Barack Obama is elected president of the United States, substantial change will come. Neoconservative ideology will be put wayside. More and more foreign policy will be pursued multilaterally, with the aid of our allies, and through international institutions like the UN. The US will begin to realize the importance of foreign legitimacy. We will no longer see legitimacy from our gut, but now from our friends.
At home the state will grow. There will be a great deal of legislative reform and social spending. We've already partially-nationalized parts of the banking industry, and government intervention will continue. We'll tax the rich more, and try to aid homeowners that have been duped by malicious mortgages. We'll establish a healthcare system that treats healthcare as a fundamental human right for all.
I believe that these changes in foreign and domestic policy will be great. Sure, hiccups will occur especially with our economy in recession and the national debt growing. But these changes are new, exciting, and promising.
Nonetheless, change is still scary and change still hurts. Just as I'm grappling with how to act with my new short-haired identity, the US will have to get used to its new identity. If Barack Obama is our president, on top of the substantive change he will bring, he will also bring a fundamental change to American identity. We will have elected a minority to lead a nation that has a reputation for exterminating Native Americans, sicking dogs on blacks seeking equal rights in the 60s, pursuing imperialistic goals throughout the world, and most recently building a wall to keep Mexicans and Central Americans out. Our identity--for ourselves to look at, and for the world to see--will be different. For a nation that has grown used to (and sick of) Bush's neoconservative foreign policy, and the self-legitimizing, go-at-it-your-own frontier mentality with our allies, this will take time to get used to.
Now that I've cut my hair it feels great; I don't have to brush strands out of my eyes every two seconds or wait a half hour for my hair to dry. But I'm still grappling with its newness. This is something that people throughout the United States, as well as people throughout the world, must get used to.
Friday, October 31, 2008
bordering on crazy
from slate.com's article, "High Risk, Limited Payoff":
Eli Lake reports in the New Republic that President Bush signed a decision in July allowing commanders on the ground to decide whether to launch tactical attacks across borders. The attack on Syria and the recent attacks on northwestern Pakistan—all taken without the permission of the Syrian or Pakistani government—are all of a piece.
Eli Lake reports in the New Republic that President Bush signed a decision in July allowing commanders on the ground to decide whether to launch tactical attacks across borders. The attack on Syria and the recent attacks on northwestern Pakistan—all taken without the permission of the Syrian or Pakistani government—are all of a piece.
Friday, October 24, 2008
Krauthammer's logic
Washington post columnist and self-defined democratic realist, Charles Krauthammer formally endorsed John McCain in today's Washington Post.
Not a big suprise, although in a editorial earlier this month he offered some praise of Obama, writing: "he's got both a first-class intellect and a first-class temperament. That will likely be enough to make him president." In this article he basically praised Obama's ability to not have any major gaffs in an election that seems to have all things falling in his favor. Like Reagan's 1980 easy election following Carter's unpopular term, Obama just needs to run a stable campaign and remain cool and collected.
In his endorsement of McCain, Krauthammer writes:
"Today's economic crisis, like every other in our history, will in time pass. But the barbarians will still be at the gates. Whom do you want on the parapet? I'm for the guy who can tell the lion from the lamb."
In my opinion, Krauthammer seems to carry this cold war mentality; a worldview full of binaries and Realist power balances. Krauthammer sees the world as an unstable place, where the US must act as a stablizing force. Most importantly, the US must continue to protect its own security and its own national interests and the best--and perhaps only--way to do this in his mind is through an strong leader who finds legitimacy from within and uses military deterence and power as the main strategy for security.
I believe this is an outdated mentality. I share Krauthammer's belief that the world is an unstable place. Maybe barbarians aren't at our gates, but he's right in writing that there are many threats to American security and interests. I believe, however, that his--and McCain's--strategy for confronting these threats is doomed to fail. We've seen it in the go-at-it-on-our-own, punish-don't-talk foreign policy of the Bush administration. More often than not, the problem has not been the inability of our leaders to "tell the lion from the lamb"; the problem has been that our leaders turn the lamb into the lion. A foreign policy course that continues to frown on the opinions of our allies and seeks to combat Islamic jihadism and failing states with bombs not diplomats is the wrong course. It is a course that Krauthammer has endorsed despite its utter failure over the past eight years. I believe that Americans have seen the failures of this course and are tired and frustrated with it. It is a course that can gain popularity in high times, but cannot be sustained in times of domestic struggle (specifically economic struggle). For this reason it is an ideology that, at least for now, "will go down with the McCain ship." I say good riddance for now.
Not a big suprise, although in a editorial earlier this month he offered some praise of Obama, writing: "he's got both a first-class intellect and a first-class temperament. That will likely be enough to make him president." In this article he basically praised Obama's ability to not have any major gaffs in an election that seems to have all things falling in his favor. Like Reagan's 1980 easy election following Carter's unpopular term, Obama just needs to run a stable campaign and remain cool and collected.
In his endorsement of McCain, Krauthammer writes:
"Today's economic crisis, like every other in our history, will in time pass. But the barbarians will still be at the gates. Whom do you want on the parapet? I'm for the guy who can tell the lion from the lamb."
In my opinion, Krauthammer seems to carry this cold war mentality; a worldview full of binaries and Realist power balances. Krauthammer sees the world as an unstable place, where the US must act as a stablizing force. Most importantly, the US must continue to protect its own security and its own national interests and the best--and perhaps only--way to do this in his mind is through an strong leader who finds legitimacy from within and uses military deterence and power as the main strategy for security.
I believe this is an outdated mentality. I share Krauthammer's belief that the world is an unstable place. Maybe barbarians aren't at our gates, but he's right in writing that there are many threats to American security and interests. I believe, however, that his--and McCain's--strategy for confronting these threats is doomed to fail. We've seen it in the go-at-it-on-our-own, punish-don't-talk foreign policy of the Bush administration. More often than not, the problem has not been the inability of our leaders to "tell the lion from the lamb"; the problem has been that our leaders turn the lamb into the lion. A foreign policy course that continues to frown on the opinions of our allies and seeks to combat Islamic jihadism and failing states with bombs not diplomats is the wrong course. It is a course that Krauthammer has endorsed despite its utter failure over the past eight years. I believe that Americans have seen the failures of this course and are tired and frustrated with it. It is a course that can gain popularity in high times, but cannot be sustained in times of domestic struggle (specifically economic struggle). For this reason it is an ideology that, at least for now, "will go down with the McCain ship." I say good riddance for now.
Friday, October 17, 2008
A brooksian endorsement
Correct me if i'm wrong david brooks, but I take this as an endorsement of Obama (granted it has its fair share of psychoanalysis and calm, slightly apathetic objectivity). Awesome
It reads almost like the Washington Post's endorsement
It reads almost like the Washington Post's endorsement
Friday, October 3, 2008
bah
i put myself through the excruciating pain of reading editorials of people i know i vehemently disagree with:
in one, peggy noonan, a speechwriter for ronald reagan, wrote in regards to last nights vp debate:
"More than that, an hour and a half of talking to America will take her to a new level of stardom. Watch her crowds this weekend. She's about to get jumpers, the old political name for people who are so excited to see you they start to jump."
yeah, she gets people excited to jump, but not up and down---just straight off a bridge
in one, peggy noonan, a speechwriter for ronald reagan, wrote in regards to last nights vp debate:
"More than that, an hour and a half of talking to America will take her to a new level of stardom. Watch her crowds this weekend. She's about to get jumpers, the old political name for people who are so excited to see you they start to jump."
yeah, she gets people excited to jump, but not up and down---just straight off a bridge
Sunday, September 28, 2008
uighurs
been readin a bunch of articles about xinjiang--a large sparsely populated area of western china. the region, also known as 'east turkestan'--a term historically used by westerners today used by separatists--is mostly populated by uighurs.
i'm amazed that there are so many places and cultures that i've never even heard about.
however, the point of this short thought was to articulate one question:
when the soviet union fell, it broke up into at least 14 independent states (this is only including the former soviet republics, not kosovo and other states that may have further split since 1991).
in short, across this vast geographical region, there lived dozens of large ethnic groups without majority rule. perhaps, the ussr designated local loyalists and soviet faithfuls as the rulers, but in reality majority ethnic groups were under minority russian rule. when the ussr collapsed, majority ruled states emerged throughout the soviet union's former empire. (most formed have since struggled with their own form of nepotistic authoritarian rule)
so, now i think about china. there are several large ethnic groups that are under han-minority rule. perhaps uighur locals who sympathize with the prc get some power, but these ethnic groups are still under han-minority rule. there are separatist movements in xinjiang and tibet--just to name a couple. i'm sure there are large ethnic groups that seek greater autonomy. and i'm sure that there are ethnic groups that in the case of a prc collapse would desire new ethnic-majority states to form.
so, 1. what does the future of the world look like? 2. what does the future of the world look like if states become political organizations of ethnic majority rule? what if the empires of the world receded, and a new world system of ethnic-states emerged? 4. how important is ethnicity? what does it mean in different places, in different times? what does it mean for uighurs in china and what does it mean for kosovars in albania?
for more background
i'm amazed that there are so many places and cultures that i've never even heard about.
however, the point of this short thought was to articulate one question:
when the soviet union fell, it broke up into at least 14 independent states (this is only including the former soviet republics, not kosovo and other states that may have further split since 1991).
in short, across this vast geographical region, there lived dozens of large ethnic groups without majority rule. perhaps, the ussr designated local loyalists and soviet faithfuls as the rulers, but in reality majority ethnic groups were under minority russian rule. when the ussr collapsed, majority ruled states emerged throughout the soviet union's former empire. (most formed have since struggled with their own form of nepotistic authoritarian rule)
so, now i think about china. there are several large ethnic groups that are under han-minority rule. perhaps uighur locals who sympathize with the prc get some power, but these ethnic groups are still under han-minority rule. there are separatist movements in xinjiang and tibet--just to name a couple. i'm sure there are large ethnic groups that seek greater autonomy. and i'm sure that there are ethnic groups that in the case of a prc collapse would desire new ethnic-majority states to form.
so, 1. what does the future of the world look like? 2. what does the future of the world look like if states become political organizations of ethnic majority rule? what if the empires of the world receded, and a new world system of ethnic-states emerged? 4. how important is ethnicity? what does it mean in different places, in different times? what does it mean for uighurs in china and what does it mean for kosovars in albania?
for more background
Monday, August 25, 2008
i don't get this
ughhh...man, can conservative media be idiotic. what a bunch of douches:
jerk
the real reason why i link the above it, like so many other articles i've seen about the convention, talk about hillary clinton. a commonly cited fact is "only 52 percent of whom are now supporting him, according to the latest Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll." but i don't get this?! each article seems to make reference to some generic angry, bicurious, vengeful, near-sighted, embittered hillary supporter. but i don't think there are that many of these. are hillary supporters really so myopic and bitter? many some, but even with the above poll, i'm not convinced it's many. here's an over-simplification of the three hillary supporters i envision (sorry for the cartoonish stereotypes):
1. liberal, feminist women
2. clinton-lovers (southern democrats and the like that loved bill clinton and the clinton brand of democratic politics)
3. salt of the earth working class rural folk in west virginia (and other rural states where obama was creamed)
of these three, i think #2 shouldn't be a problem. people who are truly clinton-lovers, are deeply partisan. as much as they dislike the primary results, their democrats and will grit their teeth and put aside resentment to vote obama. with #3, i think this group is always tough for a democratic candidate. had clinton gotten the nomination, i still think it would've been a tough job to keep from losing these votes to a republican ticket. obama is actively working to gain these votes with the biden selection, and i think just as in the primaries it's gonna be tough. and these are the important votes. painting mccain as disconnected and shrouded in multi-house luxury is good tactic for obama. the #1s, however, seem to be the most often-cited disgruntled hillary supporters. but i don't think they're a large contingency and i don't think any would really vote for a pro-life, drill and kill gop candidate.
it's all about securing #3. it was this demographic that obama struggled with in the primaries. and mccain thus far seems like a much less formidable candidate than hillary in securing these votes. they're the 52%, and they're what ultimately matters.
jerk
the real reason why i link the above it, like so many other articles i've seen about the convention, talk about hillary clinton. a commonly cited fact is "only 52 percent of whom are now supporting him, according to the latest Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll." but i don't get this?! each article seems to make reference to some generic angry, bicurious, vengeful, near-sighted, embittered hillary supporter. but i don't think there are that many of these. are hillary supporters really so myopic and bitter? many some, but even with the above poll, i'm not convinced it's many. here's an over-simplification of the three hillary supporters i envision (sorry for the cartoonish stereotypes):
1. liberal, feminist women
2. clinton-lovers (southern democrats and the like that loved bill clinton and the clinton brand of democratic politics)
3. salt of the earth working class rural folk in west virginia (and other rural states where obama was creamed)
of these three, i think #2 shouldn't be a problem. people who are truly clinton-lovers, are deeply partisan. as much as they dislike the primary results, their democrats and will grit their teeth and put aside resentment to vote obama. with #3, i think this group is always tough for a democratic candidate. had clinton gotten the nomination, i still think it would've been a tough job to keep from losing these votes to a republican ticket. obama is actively working to gain these votes with the biden selection, and i think just as in the primaries it's gonna be tough. and these are the important votes. painting mccain as disconnected and shrouded in multi-house luxury is good tactic for obama. the #1s, however, seem to be the most often-cited disgruntled hillary supporters. but i don't think they're a large contingency and i don't think any would really vote for a pro-life, drill and kill gop candidate.
it's all about securing #3. it was this demographic that obama struggled with in the primaries. and mccain thus far seems like a much less formidable candidate than hillary in securing these votes. they're the 52%, and they're what ultimately matters.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
kagan quotes i'll look at
there's certainly a lot of things that I strongly disagree with Kagan about, but he's a smart guy, and it's helpful to read someone who is able to describe the bush administration and the past decade as a logical, linear process (on the surface to me it just seems disconnected and illogical). also, his conclusion--the last three paragraphs below--seem incredible for a realist like kagan to make. a realist advocating more international cooperation and a less state-centric world?? that's what I just wrote in the post I made five minutes ago! so, guess it's pretty clear i agree with that conclusion then...as much as my analysis of the bush administration may differ. here are some quotes:
The problem with the "war on terror" paradigm is not that the war has failed in its main and vitally important purpose. It is that the paradigm was and is an insufficient one on which to base the entirety of U.S. foreign policy.
In a world of selfish states and selfish peoples -- which is to say, the world that exists -- the question is always, "What is in it for us?" The inadequacy of the "war on terror" paradigm stems from the fact that very few nations other than the United States consider terrorism to be their primary challenge. The United States' fight has not been regarded as an international "public good" for which the rest of the world can be grateful. On the contrary, most nations believe that they are doing the United States a favor when they send troops to Afghanistan (or Iraq), often at a perceived sacrifice to their own interests.
The war on terror, in short, has been a source more of division than of unity. The United States, which in the 1990s was already seen by many as a bullying hegemon, came to be viewed after September 11 as a self-absorbed, bullying hegemon, heedless of the consequences of its actions.
....
It would also be an illusion, however, to imagine that there can be an easy return to the U.S. leadership and the cooperation among U.S. allies that existed during the Cold War era. There is no single unifying threat along the same lines as the Soviet Union to bind the United States and other nations together in seemingly permanent alliance. The world today looks more like that of the nineteenth century than like that of the late twentieth. Those who imagine this is good news should recall that the nineteenth-century order did not end as well as the Cold War did.
To avoid such a fate, the United States and other democratic nations will need to take a more enlightened and generous view of their interests than they did even during the Cold War. The United States, as the strongest democracy, should not oppose but welcome a world of pooled and diminished national sovereignty. It has little to fear and much to gain in a world of expanding laws and norms based on liberal ideals and designed to protect them. At the same time, the democracies of Asia and Europe need to rediscover that progress toward this more perfect liberal order depends not only on law and popular will but also on powerful nations that can support and defend it.
In a selfish world, this kind of enlightened wisdom may be beyond the capacities of all states. But if there is any hope, it lies in a renewed understanding of the importance of values. The United States and other democratic nations share a common aspiration for a liberal international order, built on democratic principles and held together, however imperfectly, by laws and conventions among nations. This order is gradually coming under pressure as the great-power autocracies grow in strength and influence and as the antidemocratic struggle of radical Islamic terrorism persists. If the democracies' need for one another is less obvious than before, the need for these nations, including the United States, to "see further into the future" is all the greater.
The problem with the "war on terror" paradigm is not that the war has failed in its main and vitally important purpose. It is that the paradigm was and is an insufficient one on which to base the entirety of U.S. foreign policy.
In a world of selfish states and selfish peoples -- which is to say, the world that exists -- the question is always, "What is in it for us?" The inadequacy of the "war on terror" paradigm stems from the fact that very few nations other than the United States consider terrorism to be their primary challenge. The United States' fight has not been regarded as an international "public good" for which the rest of the world can be grateful. On the contrary, most nations believe that they are doing the United States a favor when they send troops to Afghanistan (or Iraq), often at a perceived sacrifice to their own interests.
The war on terror, in short, has been a source more of division than of unity. The United States, which in the 1990s was already seen by many as a bullying hegemon, came to be viewed after September 11 as a self-absorbed, bullying hegemon, heedless of the consequences of its actions.
....
It would also be an illusion, however, to imagine that there can be an easy return to the U.S. leadership and the cooperation among U.S. allies that existed during the Cold War era. There is no single unifying threat along the same lines as the Soviet Union to bind the United States and other nations together in seemingly permanent alliance. The world today looks more like that of the nineteenth century than like that of the late twentieth. Those who imagine this is good news should recall that the nineteenth-century order did not end as well as the Cold War did.
To avoid such a fate, the United States and other democratic nations will need to take a more enlightened and generous view of their interests than they did even during the Cold War. The United States, as the strongest democracy, should not oppose but welcome a world of pooled and diminished national sovereignty. It has little to fear and much to gain in a world of expanding laws and norms based on liberal ideals and designed to protect them. At the same time, the democracies of Asia and Europe need to rediscover that progress toward this more perfect liberal order depends not only on law and popular will but also on powerful nations that can support and defend it.
In a selfish world, this kind of enlightened wisdom may be beyond the capacities of all states. But if there is any hope, it lies in a renewed understanding of the importance of values. The United States and other democratic nations share a common aspiration for a liberal international order, built on democratic principles and held together, however imperfectly, by laws and conventions among nations. This order is gradually coming under pressure as the great-power autocracies grow in strength and influence and as the antidemocratic struggle of radical Islamic terrorism persists. If the democracies' need for one another is less obvious than before, the need for these nations, including the United States, to "see further into the future" is all the greater.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
