Between a rock and a hard place

The subject of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its unending spree of violence in Central Africa is a disturbing topic that deserves greater international attention and action.

That said, there are incredible obstacles that the international community faces in trying to stop the LRA:

When the ICC or an international body is asked to intervene, there are a couple of obstacles that this support brings with it. When the ICC intervenes, some form of criminal prosecution must take place. Either the ICC must investigate and prosecute the accused, or the nation that asked for support must create a national judiciary to investigate and prosecute the accused. Either way, when the ICC is asked to become involved, some action must take place against the accused.

This can hurt peacekeeping efforts. If two groups want to reconcile and negotiate peace, then having an international body investigating and pushing punitive action against one of the actors impedes mediation.

For instance, in Sudan, when prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir many believed this would stifle the peace process and exacerbate the conflict. It was fantastic that an arrest warrant was issued for Bashir for the atrocities he committed (or at the very least, the atrocities he endorsed); however, this type of international action and pressure can have a destabilizing effect.

Similarly, in Uganda the government asked the ICC to investigate and prosecute Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The ICC had not gotten far in investigating these charges, when the Ugandan government decided to begin a series of peace talks with the LRA. The government had come to believe that the best way to end the nearly two-decade long terror that the LRA had wreaked on civilians was by engaging them in peace talks. Despite having reached out to the ICC, many in the he Ugandan government thought that the best way to avoid further civilian deaths was to forgive and forget.

As hard a pill as it is to swallow—to give amnesty to a man like Jospeh Kony makes me question the notion of justice—some Ugandans believed this was the surest path to peace. A military campaign led by a regional army had tried to eliminate the LRA, but with futile and often back-firing results. With each campaign against the LRA, the LRA reemerges in an even fiercer and more gruesome manner.

But with the simultaneous ICC investigation that was underway, peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA were seriously compromised. How could a peace agreement between the two be reached if the LRA knew that giving up violence might mean international prosecution?

So this is the spot where I see the ICC and international groups: they’re often stuck between a rock and a hard place.

Letting men like Bashir and Kony run free is inexcusable. Their atrocities are startling. And when a national government asks the ICC for support, the burden to prosecute these men becomes even greater.

But how can the ICC act if it knows that its actions will further destabilize a country? How can the ICC act if it knows that doing the right thing may lead to more civilian deaths?

What should the ICC priority be: peace or justice? And should the ICC have to choose between the two? Is there a way that both can be achieved?

Now that peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government have broken down, I believe the international community should become much more involved in ending the conflict. Nonetheless, I believe that it’s necessary to recognize the difficult position that international organizations are often stuck in. Conflicts are messy, and their resolutions are often long, and difficult tasks. Understanding the balance and obstacles to this process, and asking these questions, is essential.

The Lord's Resistance Army, a summary

I’ve been reading a few web articles on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It seems like every few weeks or so, a headline will appear in some periodical (BBC, al Jazeera, the NY Times, Washington Post) that reads “15 more killed in DRC [or Uganda or Sudan or Chad] by the LRA.” That said, I wanted to gain some understanding of the history of the LRA and its leader Joseph Kony.

In brief, what I read was that the LRA has been in existence for over 20 years. The organization (if you can call it that) has been abducting child soldiers, waging brutal violence on civilians, and spreading instability throughout Central Africa for longer than I’ve been alive.

The LRA formed after then-President of Uganda, Tito Okello Lutwa, was ousted from office. This coup brought in President Yoweri Musevin who remains Uganda’s president today. Lutwa’s is an ethnic Acholi from northern Uganada. During his time in power, Lutwa was unfriendly towards non-Acholi ethnic groups—the Center for Defense Information even states that he led massacres on other ethnic groups during his time in power.

When Lutwa was ousted from power, he and his supporters fled to northern Uganda to escape possible retribution by the new ethnic Munkyankole regime. In the wake of this political turmoil, the Holy Spirit Movement formed. Their mission was to protect and further the interests of ethnic Acholis.

Government forces, however, soon defeated this movement. In the resulting vacuum emerged Joseph Kony and the LRA.

The LRA’s purported mission is to create a state that follows the Ten Commandments. This is particularly ironic given that they violate nearly all of the commandments in their quest to create this utopian state. This quest to establish a Christian holy state is a guise for other motives. Joseph Kony and the LRA certainly seek personal wealth and power at the expense of their victims.

One of the great mysteries of the LRA is how they are able to survive. For a time, the Sudan government supplied weapons and supplies to the LRA. This, however, no longer seems to be the case. In 2002, Sudan allowed Ugandan forces to invade southern Sudan in order to fight LRA bases. In addition, Sudan and Uganda have since improved relations and Sudan (likely) has not given supplies to LRA forces for years.

So how is such a terrible group able to survive? How is a group that has no popular support—especially among the Acholi ethnic group it once purported to defend to survive? Additionally, how is a group that has no consistent income or access to resources able to persist? (Unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan that attain wealth via poppy or Laurent Nkunda’s forces that profit on diamonds, the LRA has no treasure chest of illicit trade that they can support themselves with). There are a couple of factors that enable the LRA’s continued existence.

Firstly, the geography of Central Africa and the command structure of the LRA make them difficult to fight conventionally. Every time, Ugandan and regional forces attack the LRA, the LRA quickly retreats into the thick brush of Central Africa and splits up into smaller cells. And when forces are frustrated by their search for tiny LRA cells, the LRA reemerges and attacks civilians with greater cruelty.

Secondly, the LRA’s method of recruitment is effective. The young child soldiers that the LRA abducts are often forced to kill their parents. This means that even if abductees were to escape they would feel terrible—if at all able—to return to their homes. As Kony brainwashes his child army further, escape becomes a difficult thing.

Note: graphics were taken from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord%27s_Resistance_Army

Links:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4647575
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1682747,00.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050901907.html
http://www.truthout.org/031909E#comment-45745
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=2606&programID=39&from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uganda5jun05-splash,0,70542.story
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-060405uganda-fl,0,1201731.flash

This has me very nervous:

Pakistan Police Crack Down on Opposition Before Protest

Snippets from the CSIS's interview...

...with Professor Joel Barkan Concerning Democratization in Africa during GW Bush's Presidency

"...as the decade past, and particularly after 9/11, that democratization was seen very much as part of an overall counter terrorism strategy rather than a strategy to achieve a stable governance on the continent..."

He goes on to say that the bulk of Bush money to africa was spent in a few countries: Liberia, Sudan, DRC. While it's absolutely to provide aid and work to stabilize these states, Barkan believes a greater focus should be given to "aspiring democracies." These nations need support and attention just as much as crisis nations, and the US may see more results for the support and money given to these nations.

Some of the policy recommendations he offers:
+ restrengthen USAID--it's been "hollowed out"; rebuild personnel
+ mcc targets and rewards those african nation's "at the top" (= most democratized, most stable), but doesn't give enough attention to the "aspiring democracies"