Aligning goals and capabilities

I'm generally not much of a Frank Rich fan, but his article as well as recent quotes from Obama and Gates have me tacking back a bit on my post from the Friday before last.

According to a Defense Department official, Gates is unsure of McChrystal's suggestion to send additional troops to Afghanistan. This official reasoned, "Even 40,000 more troops don't give you enough boots on the ground to protect the Afghans if the north and west continue to deteriorate." Although the WSJ article that ran this story said that Gates remains equally skeptical about Biden's suggested course of action, it seems to suggest that he is weighing and exploring middle options--alternatives to drastic troop reduction or sending additional troops.

Similarly, Obama seems to be similarly exploring middle options. According to White House officials, he wants to "dispense with the straw man argument that this is about either doubling down or leaving Afghanistan" (NY Times).

So I think my initial agreement with Brooks may have been a bit hasty. I think middle options are absolutely necessary to explore--especially when the two extreme options seems so guarantee such uncertain and pessimistic results. I think the important thing is to ratchet down expectations to a level suitable to the prescribed course of action. Rumsfield tried to do nation-building on the cheap; as long as the US realistically ratchets down its goals and expectations the US can avoid making the same reckless mistake twice. The key is aligning goals and capabilities. In other words, if the expectations for "half measures" are realistic, I see no reason why they won't work. They're not destined to fail in and of themselves; they're just destined to fail when the simplified, polar goals of "failure" and "success" are the only options thought possible.