Obama's Foreign Policy via a Critique of Condoleeza Rice

Below my final term paper for the "American Foreign Policy" course I took last semester. May seem self-congratulatory, but I think my thesis has been a large part of the Obama administration's mantra so far.

From FinancialTimes:
"The Obama administration has gone out of its way to signal a pragmatic, non-ideological approach. It is a modus operandi that stresses continuity with policy under George W. Bush in terms of the tools it uses while setting out arguably more “realistic” goals."

In my paper, I argued that a rigid ideology should not guide American foreign policy, but rather foreign policy should be an pluralist arena of pragmatism and ideals.



The Past and Future Rice

What an academic writes on the campaign trail will inevitably differ from what a cabinet official writes at the end of two terms in office. Besides writing from the desk of two very different jobs—one at a university and one in Washington—the author is writing from two different transition periods: coming into office, and going out of office. In addition to this difference in position, however, there is a difference in vision between the two writers. As counterintuitive as it may sound, a new official is myopic, while a retiring official is hyperopic. A new official sees the past and the oncoming crises hurtling at them, and an old official sees the big projects and the towering tasks that will outlast them.

This may not be true for all incoming Secretaries of State (or all incoming National Security Advisors), but it is certainly true for Condoleezza Rice. This paper will contrast two of Rice’s articles: Promoting National Interest, written in 2000, and Rethinking National Interest, written in 2008. In comparing these two articles, this paper will argue four interrelated points:

(1) In 2000, Rice did not have a clear vision or definition of the US’s national interest. Although she criticizes the Clinton administration for lacking “an articulate ‘national interest’” (46) , she is guilty of this same flaw. In Promoting, Rice only vaguely defines US national interest. This flaw becomes even clearer in her 2008 piece, Rethinking, where she not only articulates US national interest much more clearly, but she also greatly expands US national interest.

(2) The second point this paper will argue is that Rice’s blueprint for pursuing US national interest changes remarkably over eight years; national interest becomes better-defined and significantly expanded (it can be summed up in the phrase “democratic development,” which she uses 14 times in Rethinking). This change in her prescribed course of action is perhaps the most significant change between the two pieces. This is partly because US national interest changes, but it is also because the plan of pursuit that she lays out in 2000 has proved itself unsuccessful and unsustainable. She goes from prescribing a largely unilateral, self-affirming approach to fulfilling national interest, to prescribing a multilateral, cooperative, pivot-focused approach to fulfilling national interest. In Promoting, legitimacy came from within, while in Rethinking Rice could not subscribe to such a stubborn approach. In Promoting, all allies and antagonizers are viewed as “competitors” first and “cooperatives” second, while in Rethinking the opposite is true.

(3) The third point this paper will argue is that despite these great changes in her definition of national interest and prescription for pursuing national interest, much of her core tenets remain the same. If anything, these core tenets are reinforced after two terms in office. Rice still believes that national interest and international interest are inextricably tied. She believes that the US’s pursuit of its national interest is in the international community’s interest. She also continues to believes that the US must take up the role of “global leadership” (10), although her idea of leadership changes. Perhaps the US isn’t “the world’s ‘911’” (54), but Rice continues to believe that it a sort of benevolent guide that knows best. What’s more her conception of interest remains one that would please both Henry Nau and Charles Krauthammer; it is a belief that US national interest and US universal ideal “are indivisible” (10). Her idea of a “unique American realism” (9) can be seen in both articles, although it is perhaps more drawn out in Rethinking.

(4) Lastly this paper will question a belief that Rice accepts in the opening paragraphs of Promoting and still grips firmly in Rethinking: Does, as Rice argues, the US really need a guiding national interest—or a “compelling vision” as she also terms it—to its foreign policy? Or does this constrict the US to a narrow perspective and antagonizing view of the world? Does this guiding interest act as a lens—a view of the world with blinders—causing policy to focus too much on constructing the world as it wants to see it, rather than looking at the world as it really is? Instead, should foreign policy be an arena where multiple traditions and multiple ideologies—multiple national interests—vie for relevance and preference in every foreign policy decision? This paper believes the answer is yes.
To argue these four points, this paper will proceed in the following manner: (1) a brief summary of Rice’s two articles (that also doubles as a presentation of problems #2 and 3 mentioned above); (2) a critique of Rice’s two articles as summarized in four problems raised above, (3) a conclusion that argues that the US may be better off without a guiding ideology. Interests should remain inextricably tied to ideals is necessary, but the choice of interest and ideals should not be constricted to one overarching mission. As Peter Katzenstein has argued, “America is distinguished by multiple traditions and identities which find expression in its foreign policies” (Katzenstein Syllabus, Fall 2008). To limit foreign policy to one single vision of what kind of city on a hill the US is, and to limit the US to a narrow set of approaches to how the US can remain a city on a hill is to doom it.

A Summary of Promoting

In Promoting, Rice argues that the world and most specifically the United States is at an incredible moment in history; a moment of dynamism and fluidity in which “one can affect the shape of the world to come” (45). With the Cold War’s end, the United States has risen to unquestioned economic and ideological supremacy. The economic and diplomatic influence of the United States looms large, and the US stands as “the prototype” of democratic capitalism for the rest of the world to follow. In short, the US “is in a remarkable position” (46).

With great power comes responsibility. Or as Rice says it, “great powers do not just mind their own business” (49); nor should they. Rice believes, however, that until 2000 the US has squandered its valuable position. Her appraisal of the past is much like Brzezinski’s appraisal of Presidents George H. Bush and Clinton: “Global Leader I [Bush]…was not guided by any bold vision at very unconventional historic moment. Global Leader II [Clinton]…lacked strategic consistency in the use of American power” (Brzezinski: 11). Both Rice and Brzezinski believe that for a decade following the Cold War the US lacked a bold vision necessary to guide it. Unlike Brzezinski, however, Rice believes this has largely been the fault of the Clinton administration. She writes that the Clinton administration avoided setting “a disciplined and consistent foreign policy” and shied away from defining US national interest (46). As a result the US has allowed “parochial groups and transitory pressures” to guide foreign policy (46). International pressure outside of the US (from allies, the UN, and the “illusory international community” (62)), and individual interests within the US (like lobbyists) cannot continue to act as guides. By defining US national interest, and setting a bold vision to guide the US and the world, Rice hoped to avoid these errors of the past.

After this lengthy indictment of the Clinton administration, Rice still leaves US national interest vague and largely undefined. Nevertheless, it is possible to pick up some of the hints and scraps of the national interest that she seeks to promote. “The Alternative” (46)—as Rice terms her definition of American national interest—is the pursuit of a few key objectives: military supremacy, economic integration with allies, free trade and “a stable international monetary system” worldwide, stronger relationships with allies “who share American values,” competition with Russia and China, and the elimination of “rogue regimes and hostile powers” ( 47).

These, however, are vague objectives that nearly any politician—including President Clinton—would agree on. The real guiding force that should steer American foreign policy is an ideological mission—a “compelling vision” (62). Just as the defeat of communism guided American foreign policy during the Cold War, Rice seeks to provide a similar ideological mission. Rice’s “compelling vision” is a vague democratic realism that would make Charles Krauthammer proud. Her vision promotes democratic values abroad, but also tempers these missions with Realist strategic considerations and the pursuit of material interest. She believes that US national interest should be driven “by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity, and peace” (62), but she also believes that this desire—absent of Realist strategic considerations—is insufficient. She expresses caution in reference to cases of humanitarian intervention—like Somalia. She would likely agree with Krauthammer, that US foreign policy must “intervene not everywhere that freedom is threatened but only where it counts—in those regions where the defense or advancement of freedom is critical to success in the larger war against the existential enemy” (Krauthammer: 17).

Rice believes that multilateralism is helpful to this “compelling vision.” She knows that it is important not to take allies for granted (54); however, like Charles Krauthammer, she believes that “International support does not confer superior morality upon any action” (Krauthammer: 21). In fact, the pursuit of international approval is not leadership at all (48). Legitimacy comes from within, not from the international community. Thus, US foreign policy and US national interest should operate unilaterally when need be.

Looking at the world in 2000, Rice sought a return to “America’s special role in the past” (62). Rice sought to reaffirm American identity, provide a “compelling vision” of the world that tied national interest to national ideals, and to—once again—lead America out into the world as a morally-guided, but geopolitically-minded, leader.

A Summary of Rethinking

In 2008, Rice expands and articulates American “national interest.” She gives a name to her previously nameless “compelling vision”—terming it “democratic development.” Under its new name, this compelling vision remains the same democratic realist vision she had in 2000; however, it is an expanded vision with more concrete objectives. It is still the active promotion of democratic values abroad. It is aid (economic, military, political, etc.) and active participation in helping countries to build and strengthen their democratic institutions, tempered with geopolitical considerations. But it is an all-encompassing mission that engages the entire world.
The vision of “democratic development” has an urgency that Rice lacked in 2000. Rice believes that democratic development is essential to US and international security. She writes, “our security is best ensured by the success of our ideals” (6). It is no longer a choice, it “must remain a top priority” even though it is “never fast or easy” (4).

Democratic development also is a wider vision than anything Rice articulated in 2000. In 2000, Rice stressed economic integration and military deterrence as tools to promote democracy; in 2008 she stresses sharper tools, like state-building and regional partnerships to promote democracy. What’s more she recognizes that democratic development is both an institutional and a cultural project that fixes the “deeper malignancies” of a nation (9). In the Middle East—and throughout the undemocratized world—it is “generational work” (9). In 2000, Rice’s compelling vision was just a continuity of America’s great past. In 2008, it is a generational work for the future.

To accomplish this tall task Rice advocates increased multilateralism. It is a multilateralism that sounds similar to the idea of pivotization presented by Chase, Hill, and Kennedy’s idea of in Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy. Chase et al. argue that America’s challenges in the world are more diffuse and numerous than during the Cold War, and that American security and national interest “requires stability in important parts of the developing world” (Chase et al: 1). They argue that the best way for the US to ensure stability in the developing world is to identify specific countries that are “more important than others for both regional stability and American interests” (Chase et al: 1). Then the US must invest energy and attention into these “pivotal states” (Chase et al: 1). It is also a strategy that sounds similar to Nixon’s Guam Doctrine. Looking at the quagmire of Vietnam, Nixon advocated “Vietnamizing the search for peace” (Nixon: 5). This meant that the US would provide military and economic aid to states under communist threat, but would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense" (Nixon: 4).

Like Chase et al and Nixon, Rice recognizes that the vision of “democratic development” is a task too tall to take on alone. Rice recognizes that international cooperation and multilateralism among states with similar values are necessary. Rice believes that nations that share democratic values also share the responsibilities of democratic development—they are “stakeholders in the international order” (9). Allies must work together to “transform international politics” (3). Rice goes from region to region identifying democratic allies that can help stabilize and democratize their region. In the Americas, Rice looks at the US’s partnerships with “strategic democracies” like Colombia and Brazil that have helped support struggling democratic states such as Haiti (3). In Europe, Rice cites the work of the EU in acting as “a superb anchor for the democratic evolution of eastern Europe” (3).

Rice even looks at China and Russia—two states with different values than the US—as essential to democratic development and international stability. Rice believes that because of the power of both China and Russia, “it is incumbent on the United States to find areas of cooperation and strategic agreement with [them]” (2). She even cites the success of this cooperation in disabling North Korea’s “Yongbyon reactor” (2). This is a significantly different perspective than the one Rice held in 2000, when she wrote: “China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic partner’ the Clinton administration once called it” (56). Perhaps Rice still views China as a competitor, but in 2008 she acknowledges that the US must partner with this competitor to confront certain problems.
In 2008, Rice’s vision remains both an Idealist’s moral vision and a Realist’s vision that seeks to ensure US economic and security interests. It is, however, a vision that has changed in scope and urgency. It is a vision in a post 9/11 world. Even though democratic development is a generational task, the US “no longer [has] the luxury of time” (Krauthammer: 24); work must begin immediately and on a larger scale than Rice could have imagined in 2000.

Problem #1: US National Interest Undefined

In 2000, Rice did not have a clear vision or definition of the US’s national interest. After her lengthy indictment of the Clinton administration, she still leaves US national interest vague and largely undefined. Although she makes it overwhelmingly clear that only the US can define its national interest, she gives only a fuzzy definition of national interest that focuses on Realist power-balances rather than an overarching vision. She spends more time decrying the lack of existing national interest than actually defining a national interest. She laments the “loss of focus on the mission” (51) and peppers her writing with bold Jacksonian maxims like “if it is worth fighting for, you better be prepared to win” (52), but rarely does she take the time to define the national interest she seeks to promote. She even admits to this lack of vision eight years later in Rethinking where she writes, “we knew better where we had been than where we were going” (1). This is a significant confession for someone who criticized the Clinton administration for not setting a national interest that could dictate where the US was going.

Rice seeks to wed American interests with American democratic ideals, but it’s difficult to accomplish this without a concrete mission that can unite them. During the Cold War, the mission to defeat communism propelled American foreign policy. It drove the US to pursue its material interests—supporting pro-American leaders and liberalizing the economies of foreign nations. And it also drove the US to pursue its democratic ideals—supporting the fight against communism (although not necessarily promoting democracy). Thus, under the mission of defeating communism, the US was able to wed Realist concerns with Idealist goals.

Without such a Cold War reality, Rice finds it difficult to wed American interests and ideals. She’s unable to concretely define national interest because her Cold War eyes can only see power balances and ideological threats that no longer exist. When she preaches about spreading democracy and freedom, there’s no concrete force or Realist strategic considerations that she can line up against. There’s no “existential enemy” (Krauthammer: 17) that Rice can build her foreign policy around. In 2000, without such an existential enemy, she cannot come to her 2008 conclusion that, “democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest” (1).

As a result of this undefined national interest, one can argue that Rice commits the same errors that she accuses Clinton of committing. Michael T. Klare gives one example of this argument. Klare argues that President Bush’s “top foreign policy priority was not to prevent terrorism or to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction… rather, it was to increase the flow of petroleum from foreign suppliers to markets in the United States” (Klare: 166). Klare details how Bush picked Vice President Cheney—former CEO of Halliburton Co.—to chair the National Energy Development Group, a government group responsible for developing the US’s long-term energy plan. Thus, parochial interests of private sector energy companies have driven US foreign policy under Bush. US foreign policy’s primary goal (in West Africa Latin America, the Caspian Sea Basin, and the Persian Gulf) has been “to safeguard the flow of petroleum” and “intrud[e] ever more assertively into the internal affairs of the oil-supplying nations” (179)—even though this foreign policy ends up running counter to the interest of most Americans.

Mearsheimer and Walt provide another example that argues that parochial interests have driven US foreign policy to the detriment of most Americans. They argue that, because of the strength of the Israel Lobby, the “US [has] been willing to set aside its own security and that of many of its allies in order to advance the interests of another state[, Israel]” (Mearsheimer & Walt: 1). Mearsheimer and Walt argue that this has been true of every American administration—each has provided enormous aid and almost unquestioning support to Israeli security—but they write that this trend “is even more pronounced in the Bush administration” (Mearsheimer & Walt: 13). They detail how Bush had domestic and international support to halt Israel’s expansion in the Occupied Territories and pressure the creation of a Palestinian state. Pressuring Israeli policy to change its course would have helped stem rising anti-American tension in the Middle East. Despite this incentive, Bush ended up championing Israeli policy. Mearsheimer and Walt also see “the Bush administration’s ambition to transform the Middle East [as] at least partly aimed at improving Israel’s strategic situation” (Mearsheimer & Walt: 2). They detail how pressure from the Israel Lobby drove a hawkish—and regrettable—foreign policy in the Middle East.
Rice’s fears that “parochial groups and transitory pressures” (46) would drive a US foreign policy that was without a defined national interest seem to have come true. This paper believes that the US entered a war that was a detriment to its national interest. The decision to send troops to Iraq was not the result of a well-defined, neoconservative national interest, but rather was the result of an undefined national interest. In Promoting, Rice is unable to articulate a clear, well-defined national interest. As a result, the US was not only prone to the push and pull of private interests, but was also prone to overreaction. Without a guiding mission to anchor it, the US overreacted to the September 11th attacks. Parochial groups stepped in to define this world-altering event. Whether they were private oil companies, the Israel lobby, hawkish policy makers, or hopeless idealists, these minorities helped craft the US’s decision to invade Iraq. If the US had had a well-defined national interest, then perhaps the pressure to overreact and satisfy private interests would not have been so great.

Problem #2: Neoconservative Objectives Change

As detailed in the summary above, Rice’s objectives for American national interest change from 2000 to 2008. Rice’s 2008 vision of democratic development expands and intensifies the bare bones “compelling vision” she articulated in 2000. To use her own words, “In these pages in 2000, I decried the role of the US, in particular the US military, in nation building. In 2008, it is absolutely clear that we will be involved in nation building for years to come…” (10). Nation-building and a strong push to link allies to this neoconservative mission both emerge as leading mechanisms for US foreign policy.

In 2008 it’s almost as though she realizes what her words in 2000 really meant. She realizes just how enormous a task it is to seek to promote democratic values in strategically necessary areas. She realizes that it is a generational goal, and needs large-scale concrete objectives to achieve it.

This paper believes that Krauthammer and Fukuyama may give different ideological labels to the Rice of 2000 and the Rice of 2008. In 2000, Rice seems like much more of a “democratic realist.” With the not-so-distant disaster of US humanitarian intervention in Somalia perhaps in mind, she writes “If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring policies for an indefinite period” (53). She also writes that humanitarian concerns are not sufficient for guiding US foreign policy. This is unquestionably the mark of a democratic realist.

In 2008, Rice would like affirm these opinions. She would also, however, affirm the democratic globalist belief, describe by Francis Fukuyama that “democracies can be created anywhere and everywhere through sheer political will” (4). She realizes that nation-building is a huge task, but that does not necessarily scare her away from the “generational task.” The line separating democratic globalists from democratic realists is certainly a fuzzy line, but in looking at Rice in 2000 and 2008, the line separating the two is perhaps a bit clearer. Rice in 2008 sees the spread and success of democratic values as tied to American national security.

Problem #3: Neoconservative Tenets Persist

Despite the above-made argument that Rice’s neoconservative objectives widen considerably between 2000 and 2008, most of her core tenets persist. Just as democratic realists and democratic globalists share the same core tenets, so do both Rices. Both Rices cannot imagine looking at the world in a purely Realist lens—devoid of values. Instead, both Rices see national interest and universal ideals as inseparable (10). Promoting democratic values and free market capitalism is almost always to the US’s national economic benefit, and in the US’s security interests (democratic regimes are seen as better at protecting American security). And promoting democracy abroad is unquestionably taken as in the interest of the democratizing nation. Although 2008 Rice stresses the importance of cooperation and international institutions, both would likely reaffirm that legitimacy comes from within. America must set its national interest and go forth and lead the world. This mentality and this vision are unmistakably consistent.

Problem #4: A Rudderless Administration: What—if anything—should drive US foreign policy?

The central argument that Rice makes in both pieces is that an overarching ideology—a sort of moral mission—must drive US foreign policy. But should any one ideology or mission drive and shape US foreign policy? Or should it be multiple ideologies fighting it out—vying for relevance in every foreign policy decision that is made. Should US foreign policy be a sort of pluralist arena where the strongest (but not necessarily ‘best’) ideology emerges? Or does this, as Rice argues, “create a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures” (46, Rice 2000).

James J. Hentz’s chapter “The contending currents in United States involvement in sub-Saharan Africa,” provides an answer to this question. Hentz articulates this foreign policy “vacuum” that Rice mentions. He examines US foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa and writes that “…in the immediate post-Cold War era, US policy lost the rudder provided by its geopolitical chess match with the Soviets. In general, Washington – at least until 11 September 2001 – struggled with the strategic lacuna created by the Soviet collapse. In the contemporary period the question regarding what drives American foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa has re-emerged with a vengeance” (25). This is the “vacuum” that Rice confronts in 2000. So is this vacuum beneficial or detrimental to US foreign policy in the region?

On the one hand, Hentz argues that in this post-Cold War vacuum, “Africa’s place in US policy remains the same as always—distant and marginalized” (Hentz: 32). Hentz describes three traditions (realism, Hamiltonianism, and Meliorism) that are battling to shape US foreign policy in Africa, and argues that today none has emerged supreme in shaping US foreign policy. Hentz also presents the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and describes it as having American business as its “driving force” (34). He notes that the business leaders of AGOA are “appointed by the White House” (34), which again reflects a connection between private business interests and US foreign policy that seems too close for comfort. Thus, the negatives of a foreign policy with multiple rudders (realism, Hamiltonianism, and Meliorism) are clear. Rice would likely argue that Africa’s marginalized position in US foreign policy and legislation like AGOA reflects the dangers of a rudderless US foreign policy.

But there are also drawbacks to having just one rudder, and Hentz implies that these drawbacks are much greater than the drawbacks of having multiple rudders. Firstly, having just one rudder can be restrictive. The US’s Cold War rudder led the US to treat Africa as “merely an object of US foreign policy” (Hentz: 37). The US supported weak “quasi-states” that were anti-Communist, even if they were not effective or domestically legitimate. By only looking through a paranoid Realist lens, US foreign policy tends to see Africa “as a threat rather than an opportunity” (Hentz: 37). This could be said of US foreign policy in other regions of the world; in 2000, Rice viewed Russia and China as competitors rather than strategic partners (56). This constricting worldview tends to limit the cross cultural understanding. It makes goals of cooperation and multilateralism difficult; if a state disagrees with America’s rudder, then American foreign policy is too constricted to compromise and build consensus.

Secondly, Hentz argues, “without the strong undercurrent of both the Hamiltonian and Meliorist traditions Africa risks becoming again a sidelined spectator vis-à-vis American foreign policy” (Hentz: 37). Thus the battle of these three foreign policy currents enables Africa to remain relevant to US foreign policy. If one current had a power over US foreign policy, then it could easily choose to ignore certain issues and regions of the world. Competing ideologies and competing strategies open up debate and understanding of different parts of the world. This is healthy because it ensures that the US does not “withdraw from the world” (Rice: 46) as Rice fears.
Lastly, Hentz takes the existence of these multiple competing currents as inevitable. They often overlap, but each always exists as a distinct current with its “domestic constituencies” (Hentz: 25). To assume that one ideology—one current and one “compelling vision”—alone can drive US foreign policy is a naïve and restricting assumption. Sometimes there is no guiding national interest—as Rice demonstrated in Promoting. No matter how hard one looks, a supreme guiding national interest isn’t always to be found.

This is the central belief of this paper, and the central argument against Rice’s Promoting and Rethinking. Although, this paper agrees with Rice that interests and ideals should be tied together, this paper also recognizes that foreign policy cannot be driven by one reading of “America’s special role in the past” (62). America has had several roles in the past—some special and others less so. Each of these roles has been shaped by America’s multiple traditions. At some points one tradition has been dominant in driving foreign policy, and at other points multiple traditions (and multiple “compelling visions”) have driven foreign policy. At no point, however, has one tradition been given de facto authority over the other traditions.

Neoconservatism is an important tradition, but it should not be crowned as the guiding force behind the “generational work” that Rice sees in the US’s future. Each tradition has a right and an interest to vie for power in shaping America’s “generational work.” And each policy maker has the right to question if an overarching mission is helpful or detrimental to US national interest. A strong national identity and a well-defined guiding national interest certainly make policy decisions easier—and often can be greatly beneficial to US national interest. A well-defined national interest, however, can also be constricting and close-minded. It can cause American foreign policy to construct the threats it fears and make distant the vision it seeks.

National interest is often a contested; it is not objectively known and therefore should be treated as such. Rice must open her vision up to the battleground of other traditions. Traditions that identify different interests and ideals; traditions that link interests and ideals in different ways than Rice; and traditions that do not wed interests to ideals at all. This will expand her worldview, promote the cooperation with allies she seeks, and better enable her own vision of democratic development to be successful.


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