Book Review: The Assassination of Lumumba, Ludo De Witte

The Assassination of Lumumba
by Ludo De Witte

Review:

The title of this book is apt; it describes—in great detail—the assassination of Lumumba and the part that neocolonial forces (Belgian government, US government, UN) played in his defeat. It is not, however, a book about Lumumba the man. Nor is it about the ideas and the ideology he symbolized. Instead, it focuses on the “anti-nationalist” forces—the assassins, not the assassinated.

Information about nationalist identity and ideology is too absent. Instead of a look at Congolese nationalism and its brief moment in the sun, De Witte offers a drawn out description of its defeat and an indictment of the unsurprising evils of the post-colonial West. The voice of Lumumba and his supporters is heard infrequently in the text, while De Witte offers a surfeit of plotting Belgian voices. What were Lumumba and his people (the majority of Congolese) thinking and feeling after eight decades of subjugation? What were the hurdles they faced, and the reactions they had? What type of nation did Lumumba envision? As a leader of one of the largest and most resource rich nations in Africa, what role did Lumumba see the Congo playing for the liberation of the entire continent? For this, maybe I should have read Franz Fanon and Lumumba’s own writing. De Witte offers a story about neo-colonial machinations. And it’s both an interesting read and a necessary exposé (until this book’s publication, Belgium’s responsibility in Lumumba’s assassination had been largely covered up), but it’s more about Europe in Africa than about Africa itself.
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After all, it was Lumumba’s Independence Day speech—and the way that De Witte so dramatically sets the scene of this quote—that first energized me about this subject. At the end of the book, I know that Lumumba represented Congolese nationalism—as well as African nationalism and the nationalism of all those subjugated by Western imperialism—rather than any particular ideology (such as socialism). Although he advocated socialist ideals, he was a Congolese nationalist first and foremost. He was a man deeply committed to strengthening and unifying his nation; expelling it of all its post-colonial economic forces. Social revolution (call it Communism if you like) was part of this mission, but only because it was thought necessary to truly create a sovereign, post-colonial nation. I learned this from the book. Still, the quotes, the emotions, the feelings—event to event—that De Witte supplied for the Belgians, seemed to be missing for Lumumba and his movement.


Summary:

The Assassination of Lumumba tells the story of Lumumba’s brief presidency, his imprisonment, and his assassination. I’ll summarize the events that De Witte tells; doing so is a good way to remember them, and it also reveals one’s own opinions and subjectivity. The events and ideas that I choose to highlight reflect my own opinions and my own reading of this history. Be warned, however, some of the details may be a bit off the mark. Here it goes.

In 1958, Congolese protests against the 80-year old Belgian colonial regime were growing and gaining momentum. Belgium colonial officials had believed they could retain power for five, maybe six, more decades before they would have to relinquish power to the African majority. They soon realized, however, that majority rule was imminent, and they called for immediate national elections, hoping to leave the nation weak and ill prepared enough that they could still wield some power over it.
So, at the beginning of 1960, national elections were held, and Patrice Lumumba, who had just been recently released from the oppressor’s colonial prisons, was elected Congo’s prime minister. At a granting of independence ceremony in June of that year, he assumed office. During this ceremony, King Baudouin gave a patronizing, paternalistic speech to the newly independent nation, to which Lumumba gave a scorching, unplanned reply. (This is worth checking out)

Despite granting independence, Belgium still had substantial material and financial interests in Congo (De Witte, for all his socialist sentiment does little to describe these business interests). Most of Belgium investments were in the southern province of Katanga—a province rich with pretty much every natural resource known to man: rubber, tin, copper, etc.—and many Belgium officials retained power and position in this province.

Trouble seems to have started when Lumumba tried to consolidate power and expel neo-colonial interests from the nation (and specifically from Katanga). It was as though two waves were meeting. A wave of Congolese nationalism that wanted to grab its rightful power as quickly as possible, and a counter-wave of Belgian sentiment believing in moderate change and the continued protection of its interests.

These two forces met as a rebellion broke out among troops in the ANC (Congolese national army) in Katanga. According to De Witte, ANC soldiers rebelled because white officers still jealously guarded their supremacy in the institution. Despite granting independence, Belgium officials were reluctant to fully Africanize the nation’s power and wealth. General Janssens, the Congolese commander-in-chief wrote the following which sums up some of this sentiment among some Belgians in Congo: “Before Independence = After Independence” (6).

In response to this rebellion (in which some Belgian nationals were killed), Belgian forces countered over-aggressively: they occupied cities throughout Katanga and southern Congo, as well as up North, in the Leopoldville area (DRC’s capital, now called Kinshasha). And this is where Lumumba made a fatal miscalculation. He asked the United Nations to intervene and to help bring stability to the Congo. Belgian forces had justified their power grab as a means of protecting their nationals and their interests; so by inviting the UN in, Lumumba hoped to eliminate this excuse and kick the Belgian forces out.

Keep in mind this is still only a month or so in to Lumumba’s presidency.

UN forces entered the nation, and Belgian forces were forced to vacate the cities they had occupied. For Lumumba’s regime, this was obviously a good thing. Blue Berets are preferable to Belgian Force Publique leftovers any day. Nonetheless it was a move that backfired.

UN forces handcuffed and weakened Lumumba; they stunted his push to militarily unify the nation. To describe this, it’s necessary to explain that Belgium viewed Lumumba as a threat to their entrenched material interests in the south. They feared that Lumumba would nationalize and Africanize industries, or at the very least weaken external control of the nation. Belgium was not ready for this; they wanted a moderate leader friendly to their interests. So, to undermine Lumumba and halt their own material expulsion from the nation, they supported Moise Tshombe, the provincial leader of Katanga. They did this in many ways. They recognized him as having greater powers than the Constitution actually granted him. They treated him as a distinct, autonomous leader, rather than as a provincial politician that answered to Lumumba. They gave him money and supplies to co-opt supporters and build strength. In short, they helped support a separatist movement that could protect their own interests by destabilizing Lumumba’s regime.

At the time, Lumumba invited UN forces to enter the DRC, Lumumba was trying very hard to strengthen and unify the newly independent nation. This meant, squashing Tshombe’s separatist power grab in Katanga, as well as the separatist movement led by Albert Kalonji and the south Kasai province. Belgian support for these separatist movements as well as UN presence in Congo, made this unifying mission difficult. The UN, under Belgium’s prodding established neutral zones throughout Katanga that prevented Lumumba and his forces from damping these separatist movements. Lumumba could not squash these separatist armies because UN forces and their neutral zones acted as barriers. Thus, the UN handcuffed the national government at the same time it sought to protect it. The UN presence allowed separatist forces to regroup, and to further organize themselves as autonomous from the greater Congo and the Lumumba government; Belgian interests and “anti-nationalist”—De Witte uses this term, but I think it’s a bit problematic—Congo leaders were given a safety zone where they could plot against the Lumumba government. Katanga (and Brazzaville, the capital of the Republic of Congo, across the river from Leopoldville) acted as satellites for anti-nationalist, neo-colonial plotting.

Throughout the summer of Lumumba’s presidency, the US and Belgium were hatching various assassination plots to take Lumumba’s life. The US had one plan to poison Lumumba, which lost steam because of Lumumba’s heavy guard. The Belgians too had a plot, termed “Operation Baracuda” (which De Witte doesn’t do too fantastic a job describing). The first real plot to materialize came in the first week of September, when, at Belgium’s prodding, the president of Congo, Kasa Vabu, dismissed Lumumba from his democratically-elected Prime Minister post and declared himself the country’s new Prime Minister. Despite tacit UN and Belgian support for Kasa Vubu (for instance, they stood back as Kasa Vubu shut down nationalist radio stations and allowed only his supporters to broadcast from Brazzaville), Kasa Vabu’s power grab didn’t work. A stalemate ensued in which, the UN protected Kasa Vabu and gave him a security escort.

After little over a week and a half of this failed power-grab, the commander-in-chief of the Army, Sese Seko Mobutu (and I believe UN forces as well) surrounded Lumumba’s house, thus putting him under a de facto house arrest. After a few weeks, Lumumba managed to escape from this house arrest, sneaking out by lying on the floor of one of the housekeeper’s car. He hoped to make it to Stanleyville (in the North East), where he had strong support and could create a new capital to support his rule. Various nationalist leaders and supporters had already made it to Stanleyville. As Lumumba traveled to Stanleyville, making speeches to supporters along, the way, Mobutu’s forces pursued him. When he had almost made it to the nationalist stronghold, he was captured.

Following his capture, he was then brought to Thysville, a military prison a couple hours outside of Leopoldville. During his transport to this prison, UN forces did nothing to protect him from the Mobutu soldiers that beat him. The UN also did nothing to prevent the illegal imprisonment of a democratically elected leader. Instead, at around this time, the UN was trying to decide who to recognize as Congo’s president for a meeting to describe the crisis. After much debating, the international body chose to recognize Kasa Vabu as the nation’s prime minister. The UN acted as a neutral observers and passive supporters to this unconstitutional coup, and Western-coordinated power grab.

Approximately six months after taking office, Lumumba and his close ministers found themselves in a dank, cold prison cell. Poorly fed, with restricted contact to family members, and without any court hearings or official charges brought against him, Lumumba remained in prison. Not only was this cruel, but it was also unconstitutional. For the UN to have sat around and implicitly endorsed these events is terrible. They were invited into the nation by Lumumba in order to help stabilize the nation and eliminate the excuse for an extended Belgian presence. Instead they protected destabilizing forces (Katangan separatists and their Belgian advisors) and allowed Lumumba to be unconstitutionally thrown from office and illegally imprisoned. They meddled in internal politics when it suited them: they (physically and diplomatically) protected Kasa Vabu, yet they allowed Lumumba to be captured and illegally imprisoned. They handicapped Lumumba’s offensive against Tshombe, but they sat back when Tshombe fought Baluba nationalists rebelling against his rule.

This is the point that De Witte makes, and it is a strong one. He wipes away the façade of objectivity from the UN; providing official documents of Hammarskjold support for anti-Lumumba forces.

As Lumumba’s time in Thysville prison continued, the stability that Kasa Vabu, Tshombe, and Belgium hoped for did not come. Congolese nationalist forces continued to have de facto control of a couple provinces, and Lumumba was still a symbol that fueled Congolese nationalism. A soldier riot broke out in the first week of January, and Mobutu and Kasa Vabu feared that the Thysville prison was too weak to hold Lumumba. They feared that another rebellion by soldier sympathizers would enable his escape and allow him to topple the weak anti-Lumumba regime. So, under strong Belgian prodding, the Leopoldville regime transferred Lumumba to the Katangan forces—hostile separate forces that not too long before had been at battle with Lumumba. The supposed intent of this transfer was to bring stability to the north where Lumumba’s imprisonment had stirred rebellions, and keep Lumumba in a safer place. Before deciding on Katanga as Lumumba’s destination, Leopoldville had considered transferring Lumumba to Kalonji’s forces in Bakwanga—an indication that Leopoldville wanted to hand Lumumba over to his most ardent enemies. A transfer to Katanga didn’t mean certain death, but it meant Lumumba’s chances of survival were slim to none. He was transferred to the lion’s den.

Sure enough, Lumumba was put on a plane with two close ministers, beaten throughout the entire flight to Elizabethville (Katanga’s capital), taken to a Belgian-owned safe house, beaten some more, and eventually brought to wooded area where the three were executed and buried. Katangan ministers and armed forces, as well as Belgian advisors and officers were witnesses and participants in the execution. While Katangans carried out most (but not all) of the beatings and pulled the triggers, Belgians stood on and facilitated the malevolent deeds, aiding, organizing and encouraging Lumumba’s death. I don’t know if that’s enough to be indicted of 1st degree murder, but it sure should be.

In the days immediately following the executions, Belgian and Katangan officials actively lied to the international community. De Witte provides strong evidence that the Belgian national government was notified of the execution by the following day, yet issued misleading statements in the following days to vindicate itself. (For instance, despite knowing that Lumumba was dead, they told the international community that Katanga must treat Lumumba humanely.) The plot gets even weirder and more terrible though. Hearing that local residents and UN forces were suspicious of the upturned ground in the woods where Lumumba had been buried (and the noises they had heard in the bushes the night of his death), Katangan and Belgian forces tried to eliminate the evidence. Under the leadership of a Belgian official (who seems to be the doppelganger of “The Wolf” in Pulp Fiction), the bodies were dug up, driven a couple hundred miles away, sawed into smaller pieces, and dissolved in barrels of acid. During this time, officials made up a story of how Lumumba and his two ministers had escaped and been killed by local villagers. Lumumba had been dead for a couple of weeks before he was officially pronounced dead.

Lumumba’s death did not bring the stability that Tshombe, Kasa Vabu, Mobutu, as well as Western leaders, had hoped for. De Witte doesn’t even go into the rest of the Congo Crisis: Hammarskjold’s death, the weak transitional governments, the five years of fighting, and Mobutu’s seizure of power that followed.

Side Note:

De Witte argues that the DRC was not part of the Cold War struggle between East and West, but rather a post-colonial fight between North and South. This is a very strong point, but I think that these two struggles are difficult to disentwine. I agree with De Witte, but I still think that this East v West struggle factored in to the Congo Crisis. The reader doesn’t get much information on this. And maybe this is a smart move by De Witte; after all, the East/West spin was an excuse—a façade—for the evils of the North/South struggle. I think a greater look at Lumumba, however, would have had to look at an ideology that is messier than these binaries and puts them all into play.

But in this ancient contest of thinking man versus natural calamity, birds are the real sons of bitches.

MikeTidwell

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